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ARGUMENT1 
I. THE AGENCY'S ORDER IMPOSING A PENALTY OF $413,750 UNDER 
SECTION 61-1-20 IS CONTRARY TO THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF 
UTAH'S UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT. 
The Utah Department of Commerce (the "Department") and the Utah Securities 
Commission (the "Commission" and together, the "Agency") erroneously argues that 
there are "two distinct enforcement procedures" outlined by Utah Code § 61-1-20. The 
Agency's position also suggests that the remedies it may impose in administrative 
proceedings are unlimited and are also far broader than the remedies a district court may 
~ impose under the same section. (See Appellee Br. at 5-8.) However, the Agency's 
misinterpretation of Section 61-1-20 would tum the Legislature's allocation of authority 
between the Agency and the courts on its head. The Agency's power under the plain 
language of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (the "Act") is not so absolute, and the 
statutory scheme is not as nonsensical as the Agency would have this Court believe. 
Instead, the Agency's power in administrative proceedings is limited to the actions 
and remedies detailed in Utah Code § 61-1-20( 1 ). Under this section, the Agency may 
impose a fine. But, "to enforce compliance with ... a rule or order under [the Act]"-
including an order imposing a fine-the Agency must bring an action in district court to 
enforce compliance with its Order as outlined in Utah Code § 61-1-20(2). Only then-
1 The Agency concedes that Phillips preserved the issues raised in Phillip's Appellant's 
Brief. (See Appellee Br. 1-2.) The Agency also concedes that Phillips timely filed his 
appeal of the Agency's final agency action. (See Appellee Br. 3 ("Phillips timely filed 
@ his petition for judicial review.").) Because Phillips' right to raise these issues on appeal 
is undisputed, this Court should reach the merits of these issues fully outlined in Phillip's 
Appellant's Brief. 
3 
"upon a proper showing," subject to the due process requirements observed in district 
courts, and the limitations on the penalties enforced-can the Agency enforce the fine. 
See Utah Code § 61-1-20(2). Under this enforcement structure, outlined in the plain 
language of§ 61-1-20, the maximum enforceable fine is $10,000 per violation. See State 
v. Bushman, 2010 UT App 120, 1 21 n.4, 231 P .3d 833 (interpreting section 61-1-20 and 
noting that "the fines that the [Agency] could impose and judicially enforce ... are now 
limited to $10,000 per violation"). 
Importantly, the Agency fails to identify any legal method whatsoever by which it 
would enforce its excessive $413,750 penalty against Phillips. Phillips is an Oregon 
resident (see R. 1233-34 ), and to enforce its order, the Agency must exercise its authority 
pursuant to Section 6 l-1-20(2)(a) and bring an action in "the appropriate district court of 
this state or the appropriate court of another state." This enforcement action would 
necessarily trigger all accompanying limitations on the district court's enforcement 
contained in Section 61- l-20(2)(b ), including the $10,000 limitation on the amount of the 
fine in Section 61-1-20(2)(b )(viii). 
By failing to set forth any alternative method of enforcement, the Agency 
impliedly asks this Court to take it on faith that somehow the Agency could avoid the 
district court proceeding of Section 61-1-20(2)(a) and the important limitations on 
enforceability of orders attached thereto in Section 6 l-1-20(2)(b ). This highlights the 
Agency's gross misinterpretation of the operation of Section 61-1-20. In Phillips' 
administrative appeal before the Utah Department of Commerce, the Utah Attorney 
General's Office argued that there are other methods by which the Agency might enforce 
4 
its administrative order against Oregon resident Phillips (R. 1233-34 ), but the Agency has 
~ not briefed these arguments on appeal. Accordingly, those arguments are waived. See, 
e.g., Broderickv. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants, LLC, 2012 UT 17, ~,i 10-19, 279 P.3d 
391 (holding that the appellee waived its arguments on appeal, explaining that "we ... 
require 'the brief of the appellee [to] contain the contentions and reasons of the appellee 
with respect to the issues presented in the opening brief. "')2 
2 In any event, the Agency's prior arguments-which have not been briefed and should 
not be considered on appeal-are unavailing. (See R. 1254-1256.) For instance, in its 
briefing in the administrative appeal, the Agency argued it might enforce its penalty 
against Phillips using the general judicial enforcement authority of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 630-4-50 I. (R. 1233.) However, "it has been consistently held that specific statutes 
prevail over general statutes." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1990). Section 
61-1-20 specifically applies to enforcement of Agency orders under the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. Utah Code Ann. § 6 l-l-20(2)(a). And, in any case, Section 630-4-501 
requires the Agency to file a civil complaint in district court, in which Section 61-1-20(2) 
and all its attached limitations on the district court's enforcement of orders under the Act 
would still necessarily apply. See Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corr., 942 
P.2d 933, 940-41 (Utah 1997) ("[A] suit to enforce such an administrative decision or 
order is an original and independent proceeding, and such actions are actions at law, even 
though equitable relief is sought, and are not actions on the administrative decision or 
order.") The Agency also argued in the administrative appeal that it could simply file an 
"abstract of award", rather than a civil complaint in an enforcement proceeding. (R. 
1233-34.) But, it cited to no statutory authority for that proposition. (See id.) While 
statutes governing other administrative proceedings in some special circumstances 
provide a procedure to file an "abstract of award" and avoid an enforcement proceeding 
in district court, the Utah Uniform Securities Act does not authorize such a procedure. 
Compare, e.g., Utah Child Support Services Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 62A-l l-304.2(2)(a) 
(2014) ("An abstract of a final administrative order issued under this section [ of the Utah 
Child Support Services Act] ... may be filed with the clerk of any district court.") with 
Utah Uniform Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20 (2)(a) ("The director may bring 
an action in the appropriate district court of this state or the appropriate court of another 
state ... to enforce compliance with ... a rule or order under [the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act]."). In sum, the Agency failed to cite any alternative to Section 6 l-l-
20(2)(b) in its appellate brief because there simply is no other method provided by statute 
by which the Agency may obtain the fine it imposes. The Utah Court of Appeals properly 
interpreted Section 61-1-20 in State v. Bushman, 2010 UT App 120, ,i 21 n.4, when it 
5 
Similarly, under the plain language of the statute, the Agency cannot impose and 
enforce a remedy of restitution. Restitution is only available upon order of the district 
court when, in the first instance, the Agency files "an action to enforce compliance with 
[the Utah Uniform Securities Act]" in district court. See Utah Code § 61-1-20(2)(b )(vii). 
The Agency is not permitted to order restitution in an administrative proceeding. See 
Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-20(1)(a)-(h). 
A. The Fine Imposed by the Agency Exceeds the Statutory Maximum. 
Despite the limitations imposed on its power by the plain language of the statute, 
the Agency attempts to impose and enforce a monetary penalty against Phillips of 
$413,750 for four violations of the Act. The Agency expressly designated $78,750 of 
this penalty as a "fine." (Appellant Br. at 1.) Whether the entire $413,750.00 penalty is 
characterized as the "fine"-as the Agency argues in its brief-or the "fine" is $78,750, 
the amount of the fine imposed far exceeds the maximum $40,000 fine allowed by§ 61-
1-20. 
In State v. Bushman, this Court noted that under Section 61-1-20(2) of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act, "the fines that the [Agency] could impose and judicially 
enforce ... are now limited to $10,000 per violation." 2010 UT App 120,121 n.4. The 
Agency attempts to undermine this precedent by pointing out that the ultimate question in 
Bushman was different than the question in this case, because Bushman dealt with double 
jeopardy. However, the fact that double jeopardy is not at issue here does not change the 
observed "the fines that [the Agency] could impose and judicially enforce . .. are now 
limited to $10,000 per violation." Id. 
6 
fact that this Court has already considered Section 61-1-20 and found its limitation of the 
@ maximum fines to $10,000 per violation. Indeed, the Bushman court found it 
constitutionally significant in that the limited fine is "not excessive in relation to its 
beneficial and remedial purpose." Id. at 121. 
B. Restitution Is Not Available in Administrative Proceedings. 
Undaunted by the legislature's direction that restitution may be obtained solely 
through a proceeding before the district court, the Agency has administratively ordered 
Phillips to pay $340,000 in restitution-$315,000 in "investor losses" and $25,000 in 
"investigative costs"-in addition to the $78,750 expressly attributed to the "fine." In 
doing so, the Agency overstepped the bounds of the power granted it by the plain 
language of Section 61-1-20. 
In its response brief, the Agency fails to address Phillips' argument that restitution 
is only available though a district court order. Instead, the Agency argues that its ability 
~ to impose monetary penalties is unlimited. Apparently, the argument is that since the 
statute "does not limit the amount of fines that can be imposed in administrative 
proceedings," (Appellee Br. at 7), the allocation of those fines are equally unlimited. 
This interpretation renders the statute's distinction between the words "fine" and 
"restitution" superfluous and inoperative. But this Court must "avoid interpretations that 
@ will render a statute superfluous and inoperative." Hall v. Dep't. of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ,I 
15. Therefore, the Agency's proposed interpretation impermissibly runs contrary to the 
plain language of the statute. 
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II. THE MONETARY PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE AGENCY IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY EXCESSIVE. 
The Agency faults Phillips for "only look[ing] at one portion of the test used by 
Utah's courts." (Appellee Br. at 9.) Utah courts determine the constitutionality of 
penalties ''by balancing a number of factors including the 'gravity of the offense, the 
maximum fine that could be imposed, the extent of the unlawful activity, the amount of 
illegal gain in relation to the penalty, and the hann caused."' (Appellee Br. at 10 
( quoting Brent Brown Dealerships v. Tax Comm 'n Motor Vehicle Enforcement Div., 
2006 UT App 261,, 18, 139 P.3d 296).) As outlined in Phillips' principal brief, under 
the balance of these factors, the Agency's fine is unconstitutionally excessive. 
The most prominent issue in this case is whether the penalty imposed by the 
Agency is grossly disproportionate to the maximum penalty authorized by the legislature. 
As discussed supra, the Agency's monetary penalty of $418,750 far exceeds the 
maximum fine permitted under the statute. The remaining factors also demonstrate that 
the penalty is unconstitutional. 
First, the penalty imposed by the Agency is grossly excessive in light of the 
gravity of the offense. For instance, the majority of states that have adopted the Uniform 
Securities Act have capped the fine for similar infractions in the range of $10,000 per 
violation. (See Appellant Br. at 5 n.7.) Here, on the other hand, the Agency has fined 
Phillips over $100,000 per violation. 
Similarly, as noted in Phillips' principal brief, the "extent of the unlawful activity" 
and the "amount of illegal gain in relation to the amount of the penalty" factors both 
8 
weigh heavily against the constitutionality of the Agency's penalty. Indeed, the Agency 
~ found no evidence that Phillips had a "history of previous violations," and "no 
evidence ... that [Phillips] received any meaningful financial benefit, enrichment, 
commission, fee or other reconsideration from the transactions involving the Persches 
and Reutlingers." (R. at 001092.) Instead, the Agency relies on its unilateral assessment 
of the harm caused by the violation. However, "harm is but one factor in the analysis," 
Brent Brown Dealerships, 2006 UT App 261,, 24, and the balance of the factors 
strongly weigh against a finding of constitutionality.3 
III. THIS ACTION IS TIME-BARRED 
As extensively briefed in Phillips' opening brief, this action is time-barred under 
the applicable statute of limitations. (See Appellant Br. at 14-21.) The Agency responds 
by arguing that the plain language of the statute does not permit such an interpretation. 
(Appellee Br. at 8.) But the plain language of Utah Code§ 61-1-21.1(1) states that no 
@ "civil complaint" may be filed "more than five years after the alleged violation," and a 
"civil complaint" includes any authority exercised by the Division under the Securities 
Act. Id. 
The Agency also cites Rogers v. Div. of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 
1990) for the general proposition that administrative proceedings are not civil actions. 
(Appellee Br. at 8.) But Rogers held that it is only where there is an "absence of specific 
3 Additionally, the Agency's determination of the "harm" cannot justify such a large fine 
where the Agency improperly shifted its burden of proof on the issue of harm to Phillips 
by requiring Phillips to prove the value of the emeralds the Agency admits were kept by 
the Perches. (See infra, Part V.) 
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legislative authority" that "civil statutes of limitation are inapplicable to administrative 
disciplinary proceedings." Id. (emphasis added). Rogers attempted to apply the general 
catch-all provision in section 78-12-25(2), to an administrative action seeking 
disciplinary suspension of her real estate license. Id. This "catch-all" statute of 
limitation stated that "an action for relief not otherwise provided for by law" must be 
commenced within four years. Id. (emphasis added). Rogers did not argue that there was 
any other limitation within the applicable statutory scheme regarding disciplinary 
revocation of Rogers' real estate license. 4 See id. By contrast, here, the administrative 
proceeding at issue is not a disciplinary proceeding concerning an agency-licensed 
individual. And the Utah Securities Act does provide "specific legislative authority" 
implementing a five-year statute of limitations for securities violations. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-21.1 ( 1 ). At the very least, the statute of limitations in Section 61-1-21.1 (I) 
prohibits the Agency from filing a civil complaint in district court to enforce an Order 
pursuant to the authority of Section 61-1-20(2)(a), "more than five years after the alleged 
violation." 
The Agency's position essentially advocates for no statute of limitations in an 
administrative proceeding whatsoever. This would create an absurd result where an 
4 While Rogers did deal generally with Title 61, Rogers focused on revocation of a real 
estate license under Utah Code sections 61-2-11 (1986) and 61-2-11(15), Title 61, Part 1, 
chapter 2 - Division of Real Estate. By contrast, the Department brought its claims 
against Phillips under Chapter 61, part 1, Chapter 1 - Utah Uniform Securities Act. The 
Utah Uniform Securities Act does include specific legislative authority applying a five-
year statute of limitations, stating "[ n ]o indictment or information may be returned or 
civil complaint filed under this chapter more than five years after the alleged violation." 
See Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-21.1(1) (emphasis added). 
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enforcement agency is time-barred from bringing claims in civil court, with all of the due 
~ process protections afforded in that forum, but there is no similar restraint in 
administrative proceedings. In other words, according to the Agency, any time it misses 
the five-year statute of limitation for bringing claims in court-where the fine per 
violation is clearly limited to $10,000-it can bring an administrative action and impose 
an unlimited fine without any time limitation. This is an impermissible and absurd 
reading of the statute. See, e.g., Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ,I 
26, 267 P.3d 863 ("Generally, when interpreting statutes we seek to avoid interpretations 
@ which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd. Thus, when statutory 
language ... presents the court with two alternative readings, we prefer the reading that 
avoids absurd results." (internal quotations omitted)). 
IV. THE AGENCY IMPROPERLY USED POST HOC RATIONALIZATIONS 
TO BOLSTER ITS UNLAWFUL FINE. 
Utah Administrative Code Rl64-31-l(B)(l) provides that the Commission "shall" 
consider numerous factors "[fJor the purpose of determining the amount of an 
administrative fine." Utah Admin. Code R164-31-l(B)(l). In this case, the Commission 
<i failed to consider these factors-instead relying exclusively on "investor losses" to assess 
the $315,000 portion of the civil penalty imposed. Despite the Commission's failure to 
consider the other factors in determining the amount of the fine as required by the rule, 
the Department affirmed the amount of the fine, but remanded "solely" to permit the 
Commission to consider the other factors and articulate a justification for the previously 
determined amount. (R. 1284.) In doing so, the Agency applied the rule in reverse and 
11 
V. THE AGENCY IMPROPERLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
ONTO PHILLIPS. 
Utah Administrative Code R 151-4-709 clearly states that "the department has the 
burden of proof in a proceeding initiated by a notice of agency action." Utah Admin. 
Code RI 51-4-709(1 ). The Agency does not dispute or distinguish this rule. Instead, the 
Agency simply states that the value of the emeralds is an "offset" and then concludes, 
without citation, that assigning this terminology relieves the Agency of the unequivocal 
burden imposed by R151.5 Interestingly, although the entirety of the Agency's brief 
relies on its delineation between administrative action and court proceedings, neither case 
it cites in support of its "offset" argument deals with any aspect of administrative law. 
(Appellee Br. at 11.) The Agency has not cited any case, statute, or rule which allows it 
to shift burdens of proof in contravention of Utah Administrative Code Rl51-4-709. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those discussed in Phillips' principal brief, the 
Court should find that the Agency acted unlawfully when it imposed the monetary 
penalty on Phillips. 
5 The Agency wrongly claims Phillips did not challenge the sufficiency of its evidence 
concerning damages. While Phillips does not challenge the findings of fact, he does 
challenge the conclusion that the agency has sufficiently found the existence of 
"damages" when the agency itself recognized that the emeralds in the victims' possession 
have unknown value. (Appellant Br. At xvii-xviii, 21-22 (arguing that "[t]he key to 
determining ... investor loss is the value of the 'emeralds."').) 
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engaged in exactly the type of post hoc rationalization prohibited by federal and Utah 
(j law. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 539 (1981) ("[P]ost hoc 
rationalizations of the agency ... cannot serve as a sufficient predicate for agency 
action."); State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d 978, 982 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("[A] remand is 
not intended to be a mere bolstering of the [ factfinder' s] previous decision.") 
The Agency cites LaSal Oil Co. v. Dep 't of Environmental Quality, 843 P .2d I 045 
(Utah App. 1992) to support its argument that it may set the amount of a fine and then 
later, on remand, analyze for the first time the factors it was required to consider in 
<@ setting said fine. (See Appellee Br. at 10-11.) However, LaSal does not support such 
action. In LaSal, the Court of Appeals found that the findings of the Department of the 
Environmental Quality were too broad and conclusory to permit proper review of an 
Order to Abate. 843 P.2d at 1049. Therefore, this Court reversed the Order and 
remanded for the entry of adequate findings. Id. 
In LaSal, there was no question that the agency had considered certain factors 
required by law in reaching its determination. See id. And the LaSal court did not permit 
the agency to work backwards in justifying a previously detennined fine. See id. Rather, 
the Executive Director was merely ordered to delineate which of the hearing officer's 
proposed findings the Executive Director had accepted and which it had rejected. Id. 
Importantly, the LaSal court did not allow the type of impermissible post-hoc 
rationalization used in this case. 
12 
DA TED this 1st day of April, 2016. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C. 
Maria E. Windham 
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Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF, 
JACK PHILLIPS. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITfON TO 
RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW 
CASE NO. SD- 12-0001 
RESPONDENT. 
The tllJdersigned Assistant Attorney General, Paul G. Amann, on behalf of the State of 
Utah, Department of Commerce, Securities Division (Division), hereby submits the following 
Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Request for Agency 
Review and Memorandum in Support. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 29, 2011, the Division filed an Order to Show Cause against Respondent and 
served him with it and a Notice of Agency Action on January 3, 2012. This matter was tried before 
the Securities Commission (Commission) on March 27 and April 21, 2014. The Commission 
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (Order) on May 23, 2014. On June 10, 
2014, Respondent filed his Request for Agency Review. After receiving the transcripts of the 
proceedings, Respondent filed his Memorandum in Support ("Respondent"s Brief') on July 16, 
2014. This Memorandwn is submitted in response lo Respondent's Brief. 
UT. Div of Securities 
Jack Phillips Case SD-12-0001 
001224 
Petitioner objects to Respondent's Statement of Facts. Respondent's putative Statement of 
Facts is largely argument. For example, in paragraph 18 of his "facts," Respondent states, regarding 
one of the Commission's findings, HThis conclusion is legal error and is not supported by substantial 
evidence." Respondent's Brief at 5, ii 18. While Respondent may quibble with the Securities the 
Commission's Findings of Fact, it is improper to do so through a putative "Statement of Facts.'' 
The entirety of paragraph 18 of Respondent's would-be facts is nothing more than argument-
argument which is unsupported by the evidence. Respondent's Statement ofFacts should be stricken 
from the record and, ifit is his desire to submit a Statement of Facts, he should be ordered to cite to 
the record for each and every fact. Respondent should further be directed not to include facts that 
were not found by the Commission, but that he merely wishes the Commission had found. See, for 
example paragraphs l5 ("The Commission did not make findings ... ,'116 ("The Commission also 
made no findings ... ~~), and 17 ('~It made no findings .... ") at page 4 of Respondent's Brief. The 
proper venue for disputing the Commission~s findings is not in Respondenf s own putative 
"Statement of Facts," but rather in the "Argumenf, portion of his brief. 
RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT 
The duty to protect the public is of paramount concern for the Utah Department of Commerce 
and its various Divisions. In accordance with this duty, § 13-1-1 of the Utah Code Annotated 
provides"~ Legislative findings and declarations," to wit: 
The Legislature finds that many businesses and occupations in the state have a 
pronounced physical and economic impact on the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens 
of the state. The Legislature further finds that while the overaJJ impact is generally beneficial 
to the public: the potential for harm and injury frequently warrants intervention by state 
government. 
The Legislature declares that il is appropriate and necessary for state government to 
protect its citizens from hannful and injurious acts by persons offering or providing essential 
or necessary goods and services to the general public. The Legislature further declares that 
business regulation should not be unfairly discriminatory. However, the general public 
interest shall be recognized and regarded as the primary purpose of all regulation by state 
government. 
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2. 
3. 
ST A TEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS' 
Respondent is a resident of Oregon. 
Respondent has never been licensed to sell securities. 
Respondent has a criminal record. On or about October 29, 2002, Respondent was convicted 
of unlawful gambling in the first degree (case number 00112764, Linn County Circuit Court, 
State of Oregon). 
4. At relevant times, Respondent has been involved in a muJti-level marketing company called 
Guardian International Travel ("GIT"). 
Elliott James ("Jamesn) was Respondent's sponsor and a vice president at GIT.2 
6. Respondent sold the GIT opportunity and was paid com.missions for doing so. Respondent 
was extremely [successful] in marketing GIT and was rewarded for his success through 
bonuses and gifts. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Respondent was the first and primary source of information for Bill and Gidgette Persch 
("the Persches) and for Paul and Sheny Reutlinger ("the Reutlingers'') regarding GIT. 
In soliciting the Persches to participate in GIT, Respondent assured them that they did not 
have to do anything other than invest in order to realize a return. In addition, Respondent 
made the following assurances and representations: 
a. The investments would be used for FOREX trading. 3 
b. Any investment would generate a five-fold return v.ithin 18 months. 
In soliciting the Persches to invest in GIT, Respondent omitted to disclose the following: 
a. The fact that Respondent had been convicted for illegal gambling. 
b. The risks involved in trading foreign currencies. 
c. The track record of GIT and its [principals]. 
d. Whether the GIT investment opportunity was registered as a security or exempt from 
1 This is, (with the addition of the following footnote) verbatim. the Findings of Fact from the 
Commission's Findings of Fact., Conclusions of Law and Order from May 23, 2014. The Division adopts and 
reiterates the Findings here due to their accuracy and for the convenience of the reader. 
2 The Division also brought an action against Elliott James with respect to the subject emerald scheme. See 
In the Matter of Elliott James, SD-12-0002. The Commission entered James' default on February 20, 2013. See 
Order on case no. SD-12-002. James was ordered to pay a fine of $4 l 2,500. Id (This footnote was not contained in 
the Commission's Findings of Fact.) 
3 The Commission takes notice that FOREX trading, also known as the foreign exchange market, is a global 
decentralized market for the trading of currencies. 
UT. Div of Securities 
Jack Phillips Case SD-12-0001 
001226 
registration. 
e. Whether Respondent was licensed to sell securities or exempt from licensure. 
I 0. In or about July 2006, the Persches tendered $25,000 to GIT through Respondent. 
11. The Persches' investments were not used for FOREX trading. While the Persches received 
nominal payments for a time, they never made back their initial investments or realized any 
profits. 
12. In or about November 2006, James approached Phillips with a deal involving the purchase, 
importation, and sale of emeralds. 
13. 
14. 
Among other things, James told Respondent that James could arrange for the purchase and 
importation of emeralds, which would sell within 90 days for three times the value paid by 
an investor (''the emerald deal"). 
On or about November 14, 2006, Respondent invested in the emerald deal. 
15. Shortly thereafter, Respondent began soliciting the Persches and Reutlingers to join a 
conference call in which James would invite them to invest in the emerald deal. This 
so]icitation took place in Utah. 
16. In soliciting the Persches and Reutlingers to participate in the conference call, Respondent 
assured them that they would have no responsibility to operate the enterprise or manage the 
investment. In addition, Respondent made the following representations: 
a. The emeralds were gem-quality. 
b. There was a buyer on board to purchase the emeralds. 
c. Investment capital was needed solely to establish proof of funds; therefore1 money 
tendered by investors would not leave the country, but would be held in an escrow account. 
d. An investor would make three times the investment amount within a maximum of 90 
days. 
e. There was no risk. The worst possible scenario would be a return of the initial investment. 
At hearing, Respondent urged that James made these representations to him, thus inducing 
him to invest, and that he merely repeated the information to those he solicited. The 
Commission did not find Respondent's testimony credible. 
17. In soliciting the Persches and Reutlingers to invest in the emerald deal, Respondent 
omitted to explain or disclose the following: 
a. The fact that Respondent had been convicted for illegal gambling. 
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18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
b. The identity of the buyer who would purchase the emeralds from James. 
c. What risk factors were attached to the investment. 
d. The number of investors. 
e. The amount of money that needed to be raised. 
f. Suitability factors for the investment and investors. 
g. The nature of any competition. 
h. Whether the emeralds investment opportunity was registered as a security or 
exempt from registration; 
i. Whether Respondent was licensed to sell securities or exempt from licensure. 
On or about January 26, 2007, Bill Persch invested $30,000 in the emerald deal. 
On or about February 14, 2007, Bill Persch invested an additional $270,000 in the 
emerald deal. 
Between approximately February 27, 2007 and March 5, 2007, the Reutlingers 
invested $30,000 in the emerald deal. 
The money tendered by the Persches and Reutlingers was not held in escrow. Some 
of it was used to purchase emeralds, but they were not gem-quality. Much of it was 
used by James at his discretion. No buyer for the emeralds was in place at any 
relevant time. The investors have not realized any profits from the emerald deal. 
There was no credible or admissible evidence presented that the Persches or 
Reutlingers would ever realize any profits from the emerald deal. 
22. When the Persches and Reutlingers made their February and March 2007 
23. 
UT. Div of Securities 
investments, around 90 days had passed since Respondent's initial investment in the 
emerald dea1. Respondent had not received a return on his investment. He did not 
inform the Persches and Reutlingers of th is delinquency before or shortly after the 
Persches and Reutlingers invested in the emerald deal. 
The emeralds purchased by James and his associates were shipped to the United 
States. Currently, at least some of lhe emeralds are in the custody of the Persches. 
There is insufficient information or admissible evidence in the record from which to 
calculate or estimate the commercial value of the gems, if any. 
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STATEMENT OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-20. Enforcement. 
(l) Whenever it appears to the director that a person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to 
engage in an act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter or a rule or order under this 
chapter, in addition to specific powers granted in this chapter: 
(a) the director may issue an order directing the person to appear before the commission and 
show cause why an order should not be issued directing the person to cease and desist from 
engaging in the act or practice, or doing an act in furtherance of the activity; 
(b) the order to show cause sha11 state the reasons for the order and the date of the hearing; 
(c) the director shall promptly serve a copy of the order to show cause upon a person named 
in the order; 
(d) the commission shall hold a hearing on the order to show cause no sooner than 10 
business days after the order is issued; 
(e) after a hearing, the commission may issue an order to cease and desist from engaging in 
an act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter or a rule or order under this chapter; 
(f) the commission may impose a.fine; 
(g) the commission may bar or suspend that person from associating with a licensed 
broker-dealer or investment adviser in this state; and 
(h) the commission may impose a combination of sanctions in Subsections (1 )(e) through (g). 
(Emphasis added.) 
Utah Admin. Code Rule 151-4-902(2) and (3): 
(2) A party requesting agency review shal] set forth any factual or legal basis in support of that 
request, including adequate supporting arguments and citation to: 
(a) appropriate legal authority; and 
(b) the relevant portions of the record. 
(3 )(a) If a party challenges a finding of fact, the party must demonstrate, based on the entire record, 
that the finding is not supported by substantiaJ evidence. 
(b) A party challenging a finding of fact bears the burden to: 
(i) marshal or gather all the evidence in support of the finding; and 
(ii) show that despite that evidence, the finding is not supported by substantial evidence. 
(c) The failure to marshal the evidence pennits the executive director to accept a division's findings 
of fact as conclusive. 
(d) A party challenging a legal conc]usion must support the argument with citation to: 
(i) relevant authority; and 
(ii) the portions of the record re1evant to the issue. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE SECURITIES COMMISSION HAS THE AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE FINES AS IT 
DEEMS FAIR, JUST AND EQUITABLE. 
A. Respondent's reliance on§ 61-l-20(2)(b) of the Utah Code is misplaced. 
The Division does not cite to§ 6l-l-20(2)(b) of the Utah Code (UTAH CODE ANN. 201 l) in 
its Statement of Law just above, because it is not gennane to Respondent's case. However, because 
Respondent inappropriately relies on it, Petitioner notes here that Section 6 l- l-20(2)(b) states: 
(b) Upon a proper showing in an action brought under this section, the courf may: 
(i) issue a pennanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunction; 
(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus; 
(iii) enter a declaratory judgment; 
(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defendant's assets; 
(v) order disgorgement; 
(vi) order rescission; 
(vii) order restitution; 
(viii) impose a fine of not more than $10,000 for each violation of the chapter; and 
(ix) enter any other relief the court considers just. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This section governs actions brought in a court. ft does not govern administrative actions 
brought before the Utah Secwities Commission. The section which governs administrative actions, 
§ 61-1-20(1)4, comes before and is directly above§ 61-1-20(2)(b). Sectjon 61-1-20(1) states, in 
reievant part: 
(e) after a hearing, the commission may issue an order to cease and desist from engaging in 
an act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter or a rule or order under this chapter; 
(f) the commission may impose a fine; 
(g) the commission may bar or suspend that person from associating with a licensed 
broker-dealer or investment adviser in this state; and 
(h) the commission may impose a combination of sanctions in Subsections (l )(e) through (g). 
Section 61-1-20(2)(b) imposes a limitation on the amount that may be awarded in court as 
a fine. Section 6 I-1-20( 1 )(f) states that the Commission may impose a fine, but gives no Ii mit. The 
fact that the legislature wanted to limit the fine obtainable in civil court is clear from the language 
of§ 6 l- l-20(2)(b ). The fact that the legislature is capable of establishing limits on fines is equally 
evident from the language of§ 6 l-l-20(2)(b). The legislature's intention not to impose a limit on 
the fines which the Commission may levy is equally evident from the lack of any statutory limit in 
4 Section 61-1-20( I) is cited supra in full in Petitioner's Statement of Law. 
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§ 61-1-20(l)(f). If the legislature meant for there to be a limit in§ 61-1-20(1)(f), it would have 
enacted one. 
The statutory construction of inc/usio unius est exclusio alterius is applicable here. This 
maxim decrees that "where a law expressly describes a particu]ar situation to which it shall apply, 
an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted 
or excluded. McKinnev1s Statutes section 240: Golden v. Koch, 49 N. Y .2d 690, 427 N. Y.S.2d 780, 
404N.E.2d 1321." KevinMcC. v. MaryA.,473 N.Y.S.2d 116, 118(1984)citedinBLACK'SLAW 
DICTIONARY, Sixth Ed., at 763. Thus, where the law provides a specified maximum fine in one 
section and not in the other, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that the fact that the limitation 
on the fine excluded from§ 61-1-20(1)(() was intended to be omitted or excluded. 
B. There is no mandate that the Director file any given case in district court. 
Respondent states, "To enforce an order entered by the Commission under the Securities Acl, 
the Director must file an action in district court pursuant to§ 61-l-20(2)(a)." Respondent's Brief 
at 11. Respondent takes indecent liberties with the statute which actua11y reads~ "The director may 
bring an action in the appropriate district court of this state or the appropriate court of another state 
to enjoin an act or practice and to enforce comp! iance with this chapter or a rule or order under this 
chapter." (Emphasis added.) The plain language of the statute is that the Director may bring an 
action in district court. Filing in district court is elective, not compulsory. The Director thus has the 
option of bringing matters before the Commission or the district court. 
Additionally, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides in§ 63G-4-50l(l)(a): "In 
addition to other remedies provided by Jaw, an agency may seek enforcement of an order by seeking 
civi1 enforcement in the district courts.,~ "Civil enforcement in the district court': does not mean 
filing a civil action in district court. Once the Division has obtained an Order from the Securities 
Commission: that Order may be abstracted in the district court by filing an "Abstract of Award.'' 
Such fi1ings are made daily by the Utah State Office of Debt Collection. Once the abstract is 
recorded, Orders such as the Division!s Order against Respondent are given a civil district court case 
number and collection activities such as garnishments and executions through writs begin. 
Thus, notwithstanding Respondent's effort to render the Securities Commission powerless, 
the Commission's orders are enforceab]e, without filing actions in district court. If that were not the 
case, there would be no reason to file any case before the Commission. The Director wou]d be 
compelled to file every case in district court if the Commission's orders were unenforceab]e. That 
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would renderthisCommission and§ 61-1-20(1) meaningless. That is cJearly not what the legislature 
intended. 
C. Bushman supports the fine ordered in this case. 
It is noteworthy that Respondents cite to State v. Bushman. 231 P.3d 833 (Utah App. 2010). 
Harold Earl Bushman argued that an administrative fine was a criminal punishment that triggered 
double jeopardy protections. Id. The Utah Court of Appeals disagreed. Id 
Respondents erroneously assert, "the Commission has no authority to impose or enforce a 
fine (or monetary penalty, however designated) greater than $10,000 per violation as set forth in§ 
61-1-20(2)(b) and State v. Bushman, 231 P.3d 833, 839 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 2010)('The fines thatthe 
Division could impose and judicially enforce are now limited to $10, 000 per violation.')" 
Respondent! s Brief at 10. First, the primary significance of the Bushman ruling is that fines imposed 
by the Division are not punishment and therefore do not trigger double jeopardy. See Bushman. 231 
P.3d 833! generally. It is disingenuous to cite to Bushman as authority and then quibble with its 
import by referring to a fine as a ''monetary penalty, however designated." The Bushman Court 
ruled that Bushman's fine was not a penalty. ld. Bushman's fine, and Phillips' fine, are remedies, 
not penalties. 
Ironically, Harold Bushman was ordered to pay $19,300, "reduced dollar for dollar for any 
amount paid to the victims." Id at 835. Thus, the structure of Bushman's order is mirrored by 
Phillips' order insofar as both allow a dollar for dollar reduction for restitution. 
Bushman's order further mandated, "If Bushman fails to pay the victims in full by July 15, 
2007: the entire amount of the fine (minus any amounts actually paid to the victims) will be due to 
the Division by October l, 2007.n Id at 835. Thus the option existed that all of the $19,300 would 
go to the Division as a fine. 
Yet, structuring an order to aJlow for restitution is lauded in the Bushman opinion. 
"Certainly, the structured fine in the Consent Order (citation omitted) was intended to encourage 
Bushman .. s prompt restitution to his victims, a purpose that is clearly nonpunitive.,, Id at 838. The 
Bushman ruling continues, "Although a small portion of the overa.11 fine did not go towards 
restitution, securities regulations such as the Act also 'regulate a lawful and important financial 
industry so that investors are not deceived or swindled through acts and practices our Legislature 
believes to be wrongful and hannful to society., State v. Kirby, 2003-NMCA--074, ,i 36. 133 N.M. 
782, 70 P.3<.I 772: see also Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Palmisano. I 35 F.3d 860. 866 (2d 
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Cir.1998) ( '[T]he deterrence of securities fraud serves other important nonpunitive goals, such as 
encouraging investor confidence, increasing the efficiency of financial markets, and promoting the 
stability of the securities industry. 1 ). Additionally, fines imposed by the Division go into a fund for 
investor education and training! further supporting the nonpunitive nature of such fines. See Utah 
Code Ann.§ 61-1-18. 7 (Supp.2009); cf Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074,, 36 ('The Legislature has added 
substance to the remedial purposes of the Act by earmarking the ... funds for public education and 
training on securities matters.'). For these reasons, we detennine that the Act's administrative 
sanctions may be rationally connected to purposes other than punishment.'" Id at 838. 
Respondent has cited to the language of footnote 4 of Bushman for the proposition that Hthe 
Commission has no authority to impose and enforce a fine ... greater than $10~000 per violation . 
. . . " Respondent's Brief at 10. This is ironic because, at the time of the entry of the order in 
Bushman, "the fines that the Division could impose and judicial]y enforce were limited to $500 for 
each violation." Bushman, 231 P.3d 833, fn. 4. Nonetheless the fine ordered in Bushman was 
$19,500 - thirteen times the amount for which the Division had ~'authority to impose and enforce" 
fines for Bushman's three violations. Id at 835, and see Consent Order dated July 3, 2009, case no. 
SD-07-0030. Yet the Court held that the fine was not excessive in relation to its beneficia1 and 
remedial purpose. Bushman~ 231 P.3d 839. No one involved in that case, including the Court~ took 
issue with a fine thirteen times the amount Respondent suggests is the maximum allowed. 
Excluding the restitution payment, the fine to the Division in Bushman was $2,500. Id at 
835. This was also in excess of the amount Respondent asserts the Division could "impose and 
judicially enforce." Bushman admitted to three violations. See Consent Order dated July 3, 2009~ 
Case No. SD-07-0030. Nonetheless, the amount was not found excessive. Respondent Phillips 
would have limited Bushman's fine to $1,500.00. He is alone in that. Bushman himself never 
argued for that. 
The Commission found that Phillips committed four violations. By Respondent's lights, 
applying the wrong statutory provision, the Commission is limited to ordering a fine of $40,000. 
However, if Phillips were fined as Bushman was, (thirteen times) his fine would be $520,000. The 
fine PhiHips is ordered to pay, $413,750, is significantly less than thirteen times the factor by which 
Bushman was fined. 
The obligation of any tribunal, in interpreting a statute, is to effectuate legislative intent. 
uour objective in interpreting a statute is to effectuate legislative intent, and that intent is most 
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readily ascertainable by looking to the plain Janguage of the statute.'' Bluffdale Mountain Homes, 
LC v. Bluffdale City, 167 P .3d l 016, 1026 (Utah 2007) citing Stale v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, 1 I J, 
144 P.3d 1152. The plain language of §61-1-20(l)(f) does not limit the Commission's ability to 
impose a fine. 
II. THE COMMISSION ACTED WITHIN ITS AUTHORITY IN IMPOSING A FINE 
THAT ALLOWS FOR A RESTITUTION OFFSET. 
The issue herein is whether the Commission may enter an order which allows an offset of 
its fine by restitution payments. This question is settled by the Bushman case Respondent cited. 231 
P.2d 833 (Utah App. 20 I 0). Bushman was ordered by the Securities Division Director5 to pay a fine 
of "nineteen thousand three hundred dollars ($19,300) ... reduced dolJar for dollar for any money 
paid to the victims." Id. at 835. 
The Bushman Court noted that "while the civil penalty may by its nature have effects of 
deterrence and punishment, those effects are incidental to and do not override the Act's and the civil 
penalty's primarily remedial purpose." [d. at 838 (citation omitted). Given that the Act's purpose 
is primarily remedial, it is axiomatic that there be an allowance for an offset of any fines with 
repayment to victims. 
III. PHILLIPS' FINE IS WARRANTED. 
Can the Commission impose the fine it deems appropriate? Respondent relies on the case 
of US. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) to say that it cannot. That reliance is infirm. 
Bajakajian was trying to leave the United States with $357, I 44, without reporting it. Id. 
This was a fedeml violation. Id. The federal sentencing guideline fine associated with his crime 
was $5~000. However, the trial Court, disregarding the federal sentencing guidelines, expressed that 
a $5,000 fine was too little and ordered forfeiture of $15,000 plus a $5,000 fine. 
The government appealed, seeking to forfeit the entire $357,144 that Bajakajian tried to 
transport. Justice Thomas, writing for the Supreme Court, determined that it was violation of the 
s The Bushman Order predated the inception of the Securities Commission in 2008. Prior to the existence 
of the Securities Commission orders were er,tered by the Securities Division Director. 
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Excessive Fine Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.6 Bajakajian did 
not contest the $20,000 penalty against him, though it was four times the guideline amount. 
However, discussion of Bajakajian is purely academic. Though Respondent fails to disclose 
it, the Bajakajian case is of little or no precedential value because that ruling has been superceded 
by statute as stated in U.S. v. Del Toro-Barboza, 673 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 2012). In Del Toro-
Barboza, Defendant argued that his fine was ''a penalty for loss and that, in United States v. 
Bajakajian, the Supreme Court held that failure to report currency caused no loss to the public fisc 
and only caused a deprivation of the infonnation that money had left the country.,, Id at 1154, citing 
524 U.S. 321,339, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998). 
The defendant in Del-Toro Barboza received a 14-level enhancement of his sentence. Id. 
at 1154. He argued that the Bajakajian. court held that because there was no loss to the public fisc, 
he could not be subjected to the enhancement. Id at 1154. The Del-Toro Barboza court rejected 
that argument, stating, "as noted by the First Circuit, after Bajakajian, Congress enacted the USA 
PATRIOT Act, which defined the 'new' crime of bulk cash smuggling at§ 5332. United States v. 
Jose, 499 F.3d 105, I 09 (l st Cir.2007). The First Circuit in Jose noted that by enacting the bulk 
cash smuggling statute, Congress was demonstrating its 'view that defendant's violation of the bulk 
cash smuggling statute constitutes a significant harrn.• Id at 112." The Bajakajian ruling is ofno 
relevance to Respondent Phillips' case, or any other. 
Even assuming Bajakajian had not been superceded by statute, Phillips' case is readily 
distinguishable from Bajak.ajia.n's. The assertion in Bajakajian was that there was "no loss to the 
public fisc." Id. In Phillips' case, by contrast, the loss to the "public fisc" was $330,000. There was 
no evidence that Bajakajian was involved in a scam defrauding investors of that $357,144. Id He 
was merely trying to leave the country without reporting it. Phillips, on the other hand, was directly 
involved with the victims in this case losing $330,000. But for PhiJlips' actions in support of the 
emerald scheme, the investors would not have lost their money. Because Phillips invested in the 
emerald scheme himself, he benefitted from his victims' support of the scheme, collectively with his 
own. 
Respondent cites to the Brent Brown Dealerships v. Tax Comm. case. 139 P.3d 296 (Utah 
6 Although Respondent makes no mention of it, the Utah Constitution provides the same protection. Utah 
Const. art. I, § 9. {"Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.") Inasmuch as Respondent utterly fails to even mention state law, Petitioner consequently 
does not provide a state law analysis. 
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App. 2006). Respondenrs Brief at 15. In Brent Brown the Utah Court of Appeals upheld a fine of 
$135,000, that Brent Brown had challenged as a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. Brent 
Brown was fined because unlicensed salespeople were selling cars. The victims in that case received 
the benefit of their bargains. They got cars. The victims in Phillips' case, on the other hand, got 
nothing. They lost all their money. The Brent Brown Court noted that the violations in that case 
cou]d not be "viewed as a benign violation simply because of the clerical or technical nature of the 
violated regulations." Id at 303. Yet, the violation in Brent Brown was relatively benign in 
comparison to Phillips". The Brent Brown victims did not lose hundreds of thousands or even tens 
of thousands of dollars. They received the cars they purchased, yet the Commission enforced and 
the Court of Appeals upheld the fines. 
We learn from Brent Brown that, "The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship 
to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish." Id at 301 citing Bajakajian at 334~ 118 
S.Ct. 2028. ·'Recognizing that proportionality is a relative concept, the Supreme Court relied on two 
considerations in deriving a constitutionaJ excessiveness standard. The first of these is that 
'judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the 
legislature.,,, Id at 336,118 S.Ct. 2028 (citing So/em v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 
77 L.Ed.2d 63 7 ( 1983)). In the legislature~s judgment, there was no such cap as Respondent would 
impose. Perhaps recognizing the inherent ability of the experts appointed to the Securities 
Commission to determine an appropriate penalty, the legislature gave the responsibility forimposing 
fines to the Commissioners and only included a limit it as regards civil cases - civil cases which 
would come before jurists who most likely have no expertise as regards securities. 
"The second consideration is that lany judicial determination regarding the gravity of a 
particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise."'' Id. The Bajakajian Court concluded that 
recognition of these principles supports a standard that a "punitive forfeiture clause" violates the 
Excessive Fines Clause on(v ifit is "grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense." 
Bajakajian at 334, 118 S.Ct. 2028. 
Like the Brent Brown opinjon, Respondent cites Stale Air Quality Bd. v. Truma,n Mortensen 
Family Trust, 8 P .. 3d 266 (Utah App. 2000) for the proposition that ''a fine is unconstitutional when 
it is grossly disporportional to the maximum statutorily authorized penalty.', Respondent's Brief at 
15. Respondent's reference to this case is inapposite. There is no maximum statutorily authorized 
penalty, as explained herein, and as is clear from the face of the statute. 
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IV. THE COMMISSION GAVE DUE CONSIDERATION TO RULE 164-31 FACTORS. 
Utah Administrative Code Rule 164-31-1 lists the following considerations in determining 
a fine: 
(A) Authority and purpose. 
(l) The Division enacts this rule under authority granted by Sections 61-1-6, 61-1-12, 61-1-14, 61-1-
20 and 61-1-24. 
(2) This rule identifies guidelines for the assessment of administrative fines. The guidelines should 
not be considered all-inclusive but rather are intended to provide factors to be considered when 
imposing a fine. 
(B) Guidelines. 
(1) For the purpose of determining the amount of an administrative fine assessed against a person 
under the Utah Uniform Securities Act, the Commission shall consider the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness, nature, circumstances, extent, and persistence of the conduct constituting 
the violation; 
(b) the harm to other persons, including the amount of investor losses, resulting either directly 
or indirectly from the violation; 
( c) any financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other consideration received directly 
or indirectly by the person in connection with the violation~ 
(d) cooperation by the person in any inquiry conducted by the Division concerning the 
violation, efforts to prevent future occurrences of the violation, and efforts to mitigate the hann 
caused by the violation, including any restitution paid or disgorgement ofill-gotten gains to persons 
injured by the acts of the person; 
future; 
( e) the history of previous violations by the person; 
(f) the need to deter the person or other persons from committing such violations in the 
(g) the costs of the Division incurred in investigating and prosecuting the action; and 
(h) such other matters as justice may require. 
Ironically, Respondent cites to this rule, then states, "The Commission failed to do this 
analysis, and specifically failed to consider evidence that the ... victims in this matter had in their 
possession some of the gems from the emerald transaction in setting the amount of the fine.,, 
RespondenCs Brief at 16. Respondenfs assertion is not referenced in any of the guidelines. 
However, through considering the actual delineated guidelines~ 
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(a) "the seriousness, nature, circumstances, extent, and persistence of the conduct 
constituting the violation"-Respondent's conduct was very serious given that he had placed himself 
in a position of special trust with the victims. He was the primary source of information for the 
victims. He assured the victims they would not have to do anything to realize a return. He promised 
a five-fold return on their GIT investments. He told them the emerald deal was his deal. He told 
them their was no risk. He promised a three-times return on the emeralds. He stated that the worst 
case scenario was that they would get their money back. 
(b) the harm to other persons, including the amount of investor losses. resulting either 
directly or indirectly from the violation; The hann that resulted from the emerald scheme was 
$30,000 lost by Paul and Sherry Reut1inger and $300,000 lost by Bill and Gidgene Persch. This Joss 
was directly as a result of Respondent~ s actions. 
(c) any financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other consideration received 
directly or indirectly by the person in connection with the violation; The benefit that Respondent 
received was that of having other investors promoting the same scheme he had invested in. Though 
Respondent may have ultimately lost money too, he stood to gain by getting others involved in the 
enterprise. That was his sole purpose in getting others involved in the enterprise. 
(d) cooperation by the person in any inquiry conducted by the Division concerning the 
violation. e_fforts to prevent futu,.e occurrences of the violation, and efforts to mitigate the harm 
caused by the violation, including any restitution paid or disgorgement ofill-gouen gains to persons 
injured by the acts of the person; No testimony was offered by Respondent regarding his level of 
cooperation! the Commission therefore had no ability to make any finding that Respondent was 
cooperative with the investigation. Respondent has taken no measures whatsoever that would 
manifest any effort on his part to prevent future occurrences of his violations. Respondent made no 
efforts to mitigate the hard loss to the victims and instead appears to hinder acrimonious feelings 
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toward his victims. No testimony was adduced at trial that there has been any restitution paid to the 
victims in this case, nor any attempt on the part of Respondent to pay the victims back any of their 
money. 
(e) the history of previous violations by the person; Phil1ips was charged with 9 counts of 
Racketeering in Linn County, Oregon, on August 14, 2002. He was ultimately convicted of 
Unlawful Gambling in the First Degree and ordered "not to engage in financial services/counseling 
which would involve fiduciary duties to clients." Phillips failed to advise his victims of his 
conviction. They would not have invested in the emerald scheme if they knew of Phi11ips' felony 
conviction. TR, Vol.1 at 187, lines 4-5 and 201, line 25, see also, Order at 2,, 3. 
(f) the need to deter the person or other persons from committing such violations in the 
future; The Commission is cognizant of the need to deter others from committing such a violation. 
It is also necessary to deter Respondent from further violations. Respondent is still actively pitching 
other schemes. There is a risk to the community, not only in Utah~ but throughout the United States, 
that Respondent will continue his predatory practices. 
(g) the costs of the Division incurred in investigaling and prosecuting the action; The 
Division has indicated, through Director Woodwell, that the costs of investigating and prosecuting 
this matter were $25!000. The Commission ordered repayment of precisely the same amount. That 
is wel1 within the Commission's purview. 
(h) [and] such other matters as justice may require. Justice requires consideration of the 
impact of the loss of these resources had on the victims. The Reutlingers had planned to use the 
money they lost to help their severely handicapped granddaughter. TR, Vol. 1 at 191, lines 13 -19. 
The Persches sold a long held fam1ly furniture business through which they employed a dozen 
peop1e. TR., Vol. 1 at 74. The Persches and the ReutJingers together lost $330,000 just on the 
investment. The Persches undertook extraordjnary measures including travel and rental fees in an 
'~L\-\ 
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effort to bring Respondent to justice. See TR., Vol. l at 78 el seq. Thus they have lost additional 
sums which they will not be able to recoup in the interests of bringing Respondent to justice. 
For these reasons, $413,750 fine ordered by the Commission should be upheld. 
V. THERE IS NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GOVERNING ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTIONS. 
Respondent contends that the Division's actions regarding the GIT investments is barred by 
the statute of limitations. However, there is none. There is no statute of limitations on · 
administrative actions brought before the Securities Commission. Respondenf s argument is 
unfounded. Just as the legislature did not limit the amount of fine that could be ordered in this 
action, it did not limit the time within which this action could be brought. 
Respondent cites to the section of the Act governing criminal and civil actions. § 61-1-
21. l (1) (Utah Code Ann. 2008). This section states," 61-1-21.1. Limitation of prosecutions ( l) 
No indictment or information may be returned or civil complaint filed under this chapter more than 
five years after the alleged violation." 
There was no civil complaint filed in this case. This is not about a criminal indictment. That 
statute is therefore inapplicable. 
Respondent first made this same argument through a Motion for Summary Judgment which 
he filed on February 28) 2014. Approximately one month later, on March 27, 2014, after hearing 
argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Commission agreed that the civil statute of 
limitations is not applicable to this administrative action and entered an order denying the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
Undeterred) Respondent raised the argument again at trial on this matter. The Commission 
again disagreed with Respondenfs argument and denied the motion. See Order at 8, 14. ("The 
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Commission has previously ruJed that no statute of limitations applies. Regardless, Respondent 
argues that the age of the transaction should insulate him, in part if not in whole, from any liability 
regarding it. The Commission disagrees.") 
The Utah case that governs this issue is Rogers v. Div. of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102 (Utah 
App. 1990). In Rogers the Court held, "In the absence of specific legislative authority, civil statutes 
of limitation are inapplicable to administrative disciplinary proceedings." Id at l 05. There is no 
specific legislative authority creating a statute of limitations governing matters before the Utah 
Securities Commission and Respondent therefore cannot cite to one. The Rogers Court continues, 
HContrary to Rogers., assertion, an administrative disciplinary hearing is not a civil proceeding.,, Id 
at 105 (citations omitted). "It is a special, somewhat unique statutory proceeding, in which the 
disciplinary board investigates the conduct of a member of the profession to determine if discipI i nary 
action is appropriate to maintain sound professional standards of conduct and protect the public." 
Id. at 106 ( citation omitted). 
Respondent makes numerous claims, all of which are specious. Respondent makes a plain 
language argument. Respondent's Brief at 18. Yet, despite invoking plain language, Respondent 
ignores the plain language of the statute which makes no reference to administrative proceedings. 
Id and Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-2 l.1 (1 ). 
The Utah legislature has exhibited its ability to establish a statute of limitations in the recent 
past. For example, during the 2013 General Session, the legislature enacted a 10 year limit on the 
filing of actions brought by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing (DOPL). 
Section 58-1-401 (6)(b) of the Utah Code now reads: "[DOPL] may not take disciplinary action 
against a person for unprofessional or unlawful conduct more than 10 years after the occurrence of 
the conduct, unless the proceeding is in response to a civil or criminal judgment or settlement and 
the proceeding is initiated within one year following the judgment or settlement.'' 
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The lack of any intention on the part of the legislature to enact such a section in the Act is 
evident in the lack of any such section. That is, if the legislature intended or intends to limit the time 
during which the Securities Division may bring an action, such a statutory revision is necessary. 
Indeed, rather than lobby for enforcement of a law that does not exist, Respondenfs efforts may be 
better directed toward lobbying for changes to existing 1 aw that would al low for the accommodation 
of his proscribed activity. 
Respondent claims, uUltimately, a civil complaint is necessary before the Division can 
enforce any order related to an alleged violation. To enforce an order entered by the Commission 
under the Securities Act, the Director must file an action in district court pursuant to § 61-1-
20(2)(a)." Respondent's claim has no basis in law or in fact. If there were any veracity to 
Respondenf s claim, it would make the Securities Commission and each of its appointees entirely 
superfluous. Orders of the Commission are enforceable independently of any civil action in district 
court. 
In arguing for the existence of a non-existent five year statute of limitations, Respondent 
argues~ "unlike traditional crimes such as theft or murder where it may take law enforcement many 
years to identify a potential defendant, in securities fraud cases the identity of the potentia] defendant 
is almost always known and easily identifiable.,, Respondent's Brief at 19. Respondent's argument 
is infirm for numerous reasons, including: 
1.) The crime of theft has a statute of limitations. 
2.) The crime of securities fraud also has a statute oflimitations. 
3.) Securities fraud crimes are often concealed for years and the suspect is necessarily wiknown in 
such cases. 
4.) Statutes of limitations regarding crimes are inapposite as regards this administrative action. 
Respondent expresses concern that the Division could bring an action from the 1970s. 
j?44 
UT. Div of Securities I 9 
Jack Phillips Case SD-12-0001 
001242 
However, he has no standing to raise such a claim. RespondenCs securities violations were not in 
the 1970s, the 1980s, or even the 1990s - nor does Respondent cite to any such case, or any forty, 
thirty, twenty, or even ten year old case. There aren't any. In this instance, Respondent's reductio 
ad absurdum is merely absurd. 
Respondent takes language from the Commission's Order and contorts it beyond what the 
Commission intended into something completely different that the Order's actual language. The 
Order states, "The Division has the discretion to prosecute any case, regardless of its age. While the 
Division might make it a practice on an ad hoc basis to decline a prosecution of a violation that 
occurred more than five years prior to the date a complaint is submitted, it is not required to adhere 
to such a practice without exception, and does not. It is a question of agency discretion.'' Order at 
8, ,t 5. That is, the Division had the discretion to bring the Phillips case. 
Respondent turns this Conclusion of Law into an "admission~' by the Division that its 
"regular practice" is not filing cases outside of five years. Respondent's Brief at 20. Respondent 
then claims "the Division has acted contrary to an admitted agency rule.'' Id at 21. There is no such 
rule. After his W1successful attempt at creating statutes, Respondent now seeks to create rules. 
Respondent's argument is fiivolous. Respondentjustifiably anticipates the Division will prevail on 
this issue: "if the Division successfully argues that the Division, s policy is not an explicit rule ... 
_,, Id. 
At trial on this matter, and at the hearing on the Motion for Swnmary Judgment: Petitioner's 
expressed position was that Respondent,s actions were egregious enough to warrant pursuing the 
GIT matter, particularly in conjunction with its action against Respondent for his emerald scheme, 
although the Division may have brought the GIT matter sooner. Respondent's claim that "the agency 
utterly failed to provide [Respondent] with any rationale why the Division chose to pursue Mr. 
Phillips over the countless other stale claims thej>ivision disregards every year" is also false for 
llo4? 
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numerous reasons, including: 
I.) The Division expressed to Respondent numerous times that it was pursuing justice for 
Respondent due to the egregious nature of his violations. 
2.) The number of claims the Division addresses each year is not countless; the Division tracks 
claims fastidiously. 
3.) The Division does not disregard any claims. Each c]aim made to the Division is given individual 
attention and processed scrupulously. 
In sum, argument regarding statute of limitations is not based in reality. It is based upon 
Respondent's desire for the enacbnent of a statute and a rule which do not exist. 
Finally! as regards the public policy behind granting the Division to ability to proceed against 
Respondents without imposition of any statute of limitations, one only need consider such Ponzi 
schemes as Bernie Madoff perpetrated. Madoff, and perpetrators like rum, are able to lull their 
victims into inactivity for years and years through hosts of devious machinations that often involve 
untold accomplices and are inherently designed to avoid detection. Similarly, Respondent Phillips 
promised his victims significant profit within 90 days. When that did not occur, Respondent made 
additional misrepresentations in an effort to preclude action on the part of the investors. Often, in 
such cases, investors are coaxed out of even more of their assets. The perpetrators of these securities 
fraud cases are often beloved family members, church or business associates whose faith in the 
perpetrators is the perpetrators' greatest ally. That faith allows the victims to be taken advantage 
of in the first place and is also often relied upon to extend deadlines for years - often beyond 
criminal and civil statutes oflimitations. In such cases! the perpetrators would escape justice entirely 
ifa statute oflimitations were imposed on administrative actions. Public policy militates agajnst the 
imposition of a time limit on the filing of administrative actions. 
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VI. RESPONDENT MADE UNTRUE STATEMENTS. 
Respondent made untrue statements to his victims, the Persches and the Reutlingers. He was 
not merely an "intermediary" as Respondent suggests. When asked about the emerald scheme and 
how it was presented, Bill Persch testified, 
He said, "BilJ, what do you know about emeralds?" 1 said, "Nothing." 
[Respondent replied] ''Well, r do, and I have .. -- "I have a situation, because of 
what you've done on the GIT thing, making the maximum investment and because 
I love you kids and you guys do so many good things and so many donations you 
do! I can pick and choose who I can bring in, and r bting in you on my deal. 11 He 
called it his deal. 
TR. Vol.lat 51, lines 11-18. 
Respondent went on with fw1her representations, according to Persch: 
He's the one that picked and chose who came in, and he said, again, 11lt1s an 
absolute insured gem quality emerald investment. You will make your money 
back in 90 or probably less, but, worst-case scenario, 90 days. We1re going to 
make so much money on this that I can again pay you three times and they'll still 
be funds left over.'' 
TR. Vol. I at 51, lines 19-25. 
Though Respondent may not have been the Hultimate authority" on emerald transactions, he 
conveyed to his victims that he was. 
As Respondent sought to enact legislation and rules as regards Statutes of Limitations, 
here he seeks to introduce concepts which have no relevance to Respondent's culpability for 
violations of the Act. He states that he "had no fiduciary duty that would impose an obligation Lo 
do due diligence on behalf of the alleged investors." Respondent~ s Brief at 23. Respondent's 
repeated references to "alleged investors'~ is an affront to the evidence in this case. There is no 
question that the Persches and the Reutlingers lost $3 J 5,000 due to Respondent's actions. They 
were investors. It is bad faith for Respondent to now deny that these victims were investors. 
There was no evidence adduced by Respondent that the Persches and Reutlingers were not )?-q.t 
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investors or that they did not lose $315,000. 
The Commission considered and rejected Respondent's Janus Capital argument. Order 
at 11 - 12 (citing Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)). The 
Commission notes that the Janus Capital test has not been adopted in Utah. Order at 11) 1 15. 
"[T]he applicab]e law does not distinguish the creator of a false statement from a person who 
repeats or passes along infonnation.,., Id. 
HSecond, even if the Janus Capital test were the law in Utah, Respondent did have 
authority over the content and dissemination of the statements he ma.de." Id at ~I 16. 
Respondent "personally sought out investors and made verbal representations and promises to 
them." Id. at 12, 116. As Petitioner notes above: the Commission noted "Respondent described 
the emerald deal as 'his deal'.'\ Id. ''He had control over the statements he made. He had 
complete discretion regarding to whom he made the statements." Id The Commission goes on 
to conclude that Respondent is not credible in his "argument to the effect that he couldn~t have 
known he was sharing untrue infonnation." Id The Commission concludes that "Respondent is 
liable for the statements he made to the Persches and the Reutlingers.\' Id. 
VU. RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO MAKE OUT ANY CLAIM FOR OFFSET. 
The issue herein is: does Respondent bear the responsibility for successfully supporting 
his defenses. Of course he bears that burden. Respondent claims that there is some inherent 
value in the green rocks that were involved in the emerald scheme. In his testimony, Bill Persch 
indicated that Mike's Jewelry in Salt Lake said that the rocks were "gravel." TR, Vol. I, at 223 -
224. 
Respondent never took any action to report the rocks stolen. Respondent never brought 
any lawsuit to retrieve the rocks. Indeed, throughout this proceeding, while his counsel 
attempted to assert that there may be some astronomical value in these rocks~ Respondent himself 
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never once expressed any desire to have to have the rocks in his custody. Respondent failed to 
adduce any credible evidence at trial that the value of the green rocks was anything but 
negligible. 
The rocks have been stored by the Persches merely for evidentiary purposes. The 
Persches have paid all the costs associated with storing the rocks. Respondent never even 
offered to pay those costs. As stated by the Commission, the Persches, aim in entering the 
emerald scheme was not to obtain green rocks, or even genuine gemstone quality emeralds. 
"Their objective was to realize a financial profit. 0 Order at 13, ~ 19. That's what Respondent 
enticed them into believing would occur: that they would realize financial profit. 
Despite Respondent's claims, the Division has no obligation to prove RespondenCs 
defense or defenses. Respondent "failed to provide admissible, credible evidence sufficient to 
establish a basis for offsetting the fine requested by the Division." Id The green rocks/gravel 
are oflittle or no value as evidenced by all the facts of this case. The requested: and now 
imposed fine, takes this into consideration. If Respondent had any evidence to the contrary, it 
was his duty to introduce it at trial. 
VIII. RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 1S1-4-902 OF THE 
UT AH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. 
Respondent has failed to comply with the rules governing his appeal. Respondent has not 
met the substance of this rule. Rule 151-4-902(2) of the Utah Administrative Code mandates 
that Respondent "set forth any factual or legal basis in support of [his] request, including 
adequate supporting arguments and citation to: (a) appropriate legal authority; and (b) the 
relevant portions of the record." Respondent has not supplied legal authority, nor relevant 
portions of the record that would provide any basis for overturning the Order of the Securities 
Commission. 
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Utah Admin. Code Rule 151-4-902(3) of the mandates~ 
(a) If a party challenges a finding of fact, the party must demonstrate, based on the 
entire record, that the finding is not supported by substantial evidence. 
(b) A party challenging a finding of fact bears the burden to: 
(i) marshal or gather all the evidence in supporl of the finding; and 
(ii) show that despite that evidence, the finding is not supported by 
substantial evidence. 
(c) The failure to marshal the evidence permits the executive di.rector to accept a 
division's findings of fact as conclusive. 
(d) A party challenging a legal conclusion must support the argument with citation 
to: 
(i) relevant authority; and 
(ii) the portions of the record relevant to the issue. 
Respondent has failed to demonstrate that the findings of the commission are not supported by 
substantial evidence. That was Respondent's burden. UTAH ADMJN. CODE Rl51-4-902(3)(b). 
He has not shown that, despite the evidence, the finding is not supported. The executive director 
can and should accept the Commission's findings of fact as conclusive. UTAH ADMIN. CODE 
RI 5 l-4-902(3)(c). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Respondent's Request should be denied and he should take 
nothing thereby. The Commission's Order should be affirmed. 
J-.--
DATED this /5day of August, 2014. 
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RECEIVED 
AUG 2 7 201.1, 
UTAH OEPT. OF 
COMMERCE 
Attorneys for Respondent Jack Phillips 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
JACK PHfLLIPS, 
Respondent. 
BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW 
Case No. SD-12-0001 
INTRODUCTf ON 
Jack Phillips ("Phil lips"), through the undersigned counsel of record and pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-4-30 l and Utah Admin. Code R. l 5 l-4-90 l et seq. hereby submits his Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Request for Agency Review. As set forth in Phillips' opening 
memorandum, the Utah Securities Commission ("Commission") grossly exceeded its statutory 
authority and violated Phillips' Eighth Amendment rights by imposing a civil penalty far in 
excess of $10,000 per violation and ordering restitution. The Utah Division of Securities' 
("Division") response that it is not bound by the limitation on the amount of the fine in Section 
61-1-20 because it is not required to enforce an award in district court is entirely without merit 
and contrary to Utah Court of Appeals precedent. There is no statutory authority for the Division 
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to skip civil enforcement and file an "Abstract of Award,,, as is the Division's apparent practice. 
Additionally, neither the statute nor the constitution, grants the Division limitless authority to 
impose a fine in its discretion .as the Division claims. Nor does the statute free the Division 
from the statute of limitations. Finally, the Commission also erred in shifting the burden of proof 
concerning the "investor loss'' factor and in interpreting the Utah Securities Act to impose a duty 
of due diligence on a layperson investor who does not receive a payment or commission for his 
involvement in bringing additional investors into a scheme. 
1. 
RESPONSE CONCERNING THE DIVlSION'S ATTACK ON PHaLIPS' 
''STATEMENT OF FACTS,. 
The Statement of Facts Cannot Be Stricken on an Unstated Procedural Rule 
The Division suggests that Phillips violated "procedure'' and thus Phillips' "Statement of 
Facts,, should be stricken as a sanction because, according to the Division, Phillips should have 
marshalled the evidence and made arguments concerning whether the Commissions' findings of 
fact are supported by substantial evidence in the "Argument" section of the brief, rather than in a 
section with the heading "Statement of Facts." However, the Division cites no administrative 
rule that sets out such fonnatting requirements: and Phillips' alleged violation of an (unstated) 
procedural rule is not a valid basis for disregarding a section of Phillips brief. 
2. Phillips Properly Marshalls the Evidence in His Statement of Facts 
Furthennore, Phillips' statement of facts is not argumentative, as it accepts as true the 
findings of fact with the exception of paragraph 17. Phillips' opening brief therefore properly 
marshalis the evidence in support of the agency's findings of fact. It then properly supplements 
the accepted findings of fact with specific citations to the stipulated facts officially entered into 
the record of the proceeding and appropriately identifies stipulated evidence on which the 
Commission made no contrary findings. With regard lo paragraph 17, Phillips expressly 
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marshalled all the evidence that favors the Commission's findings. No more is required by the 
applicable administrative rules. The Division's attempt to exclude a section of Phillips' brief on 
unstated procedural technicalities, together with the Division's lack of a substantive response to 
Phillip's Statement of Facts, is evidence that the Statement of Facts in Phillips' opening brief is 
well founded in the evidence of the case. 
ARGUMENT 
J. THE DIVISION'S BRIEF ADDS NO LEGAL SUPPORT FOR THE ORDERED 
FINE, WHICH JS WITHOUT STATUTORY AUTHORITY, EXCESSIVE, AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A. The Division Is Entirely Without Statutory Authority to File an "Abstract of 
Award" In Lieu of Observing the Limitations of§ 61-l-20(2)(b)(viii). Its 
Proclaimed Practice of Filing an Abstract of Award ls a Power Grab 
Improperly Designed to Avoid District Court Review of the Division's 
Observance of Its Statutory Jurisdiction Prior to Enforcement 
In State v. Bushman, 23 l P .3d 83 3 (Utah Ct. App. 20 I 0), the Utah Court of Appeals 
based its holding that the administrative sanctions permitted under the Utah Securities Act are on 
their face not excessive in relation to their purpose for the purpose of the double jeopardy 
analysis on the fact that the fines the Utah Divisio11 of Securities c:an impo.fe and judicially 
enforce are limited to $10,000 per violation. Id. al 839 n.4. The Division's brief twists and 
attempts to distract from this governing Utah Court of Appeals precedent, ultimately ignoring the 
fact that, under any reading of the case, the Utah Court of appeals necessarily read and relied on 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-20(2)(b)(viii) as limiting the amount of the enforceable fine under 
section 61-1-20(1 ). 1 Bushman must be followed and the amount of Phillips' penalty must be 
reduced accordingly in this case. 
1 The Division erroneously argues the facts of the Bushman case as if legal issues other than double 
jeopardy had been considered by the Court. For instance, the Division argues that the actual fine awarded against 
the defendant in that case exceeded the $500 statutory maximum at lhe time of the consent order, and then:fore lhat 
the Utah Court of Appeals could not possibly mean what it said (that the judicially enforceable maximum penaJty 
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Instead of following the limitations on the fines that may be imposed as interpreted in 
Bushman, the Division seeks to expand its jurisdiction far beyond the limitations of its governing 
statutes by arguing that, in lieu of filing a civil action, (in which it would be required to observe 
the statutory limitations on the amounts of fines under Section 6 l-l-20(2)(b)(viii}}, it can file an 
"Abstract of Award" and avoid the statutory provisions allowing the respondent a defense of an 
enforcement proceeding in the district court. Notably, the Agency cites to no statutory authority 
in support. of the proposition that that it is granted authority to fite an "Abstract of Award'' rather 
than a civil complaint in an enforcement proceeding. All the Agency can cite in support is its 
pasl course of conduct, which is nothing but a previously unchal lengcd power grab utterly 
without legal authority. Certain statutes, none of which are applicable to the Utah Division of 
Securities, expressly provide for recovery of specified administrative awards through an 
"abstract of final order providing an award" without an enforcement proceeding that would give 
the respondent an opportunity to raise enforcement-related defenses in the district court. 2 
However, nowhere in the Utah Securities Act, or in the Administrative Procedures Act, is there 
any authority whatsoever that would allow the Utah Division of Securities to shortcut a civil 
enforcement proceeding by filing an "abstract of award. " 3 Even if Section 630-4-501 of the 
!hat can be imposed by the Utah Division of Securities is$ I0,000 per violation). However, the amount of the fine 
was not challenged as in excess of statutory authority granted by Section 61-1-20 by !he defendant j n that case. 
Bushman considered only the issue of double jeopardy, and therefore the correctness of the amount of the fine 
would not have been properly considered by the Court. The Court considered only the maximum penally permitted 
under the language of the statute and determined as a matter of law that based on the $ I 0,000 limit per offense the 
.statute was not punitive. Therefore, the amount of the award in that case has no bearing on the Utah Court of 
Appeals pronouncement on the interpretation of Section 61-1-20. Similarly, the: Court did not consider whether the 
Commission could impose a penalty of restitution, contrary to the Division's arguments, because that issue also was 
not raised on appeal. Moreover, as described in Section T.8. below, the fine was offset by restitution paid. There 
was not an award ofrestirution, in contrast to the Commission's order in this case. 
1 Namely, these statutes are in the Utah Labor Code, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-2 l 2 (2014), rhe Child 
Support Recovery Act, see id. § 62A-11-304 .2 (2014), and the act providing for collection of student loans, see id. § 
SJB-14-106 (2014). 
1 The very maxim of statutory construction cited by the Division in its brief, expres.sio 1mius es/ e:.i:clusio 
o/Jerius or, "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another" is applicable here. Kocherhans v. Orem Cily, 
20 l J UT App,~ 14. Where other agencies are expressly granted the authority to skip further legal review in 
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Administrative procedure act applies, which is the only legal enforcement authority cited by the 
Division, section 63G-4-50 I expressly requires the Division to seek an order from the district 
court enforcing an award, and the Respondent is entitled to raise defenses, including the defense 
of lack of jurisdiction therein. 4 Therefore, the Division's claim that the commission can enforce 
its orders without filing an action in district court is clearly erroneous. 5 
With regard to the question whether the Division can avoid the imposition of limitations 
on the amount of the fine by enforcing its order through section 63G-4-50 l rather than by section 
61-1-20(b), the answer is it cannot. Both section 630-4-501 and section 61-1-20 provide for the 
filing of an enforcement proceeding in district court. Therefore, either the provisions of both 
apply in such a proceeding, or, as the statute specific to judicial enforcement of administrative 
orders in the context of the Utah Securities Act, the enforcement provisions of the securities Act 
applies. "It has been consistently held that specific statutes prevail over general statutes." State 
v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1990). In either case, the Court will apply the $10,000 per 
violation limitation on the Divisions sanctions set forth in section 61-1-20. 
enforcement of orders and file an "abstract of final order providing an award" the absence of such express authority 
indicates this power was not granted to the Utah Division of Securities. Indeed the Division's proclaimed practice 
of filing an abstract of award is contrary to the procedure required by either Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20 or Utah 
Cocle Ann.§ 630-4-501 (the only Section cited by the Division). 
4 Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-50 I provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
( l)(a) In addition to other remedies provided by law, an agency may seek enforcement of an order by seeking civil 
enforcement in the district couns. 
(b) The actitm seeking civil enforcement ofan agency's order must name, as defendants, each alleged violator 
against whom !he agency seeks to obtain civil enforcement. 
(d) The action may request, and the courJ may grant, any of the following: (i) declaratory relief; (ii) temporary or 
permanent injunctive relief; (iii) any other civil remedy provided by law; or (iv) any combination of the foregoing .. 
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agency's order, in additio11 to a11y other defenses a/Jowed by law, 
a defendant ,nay defend on the ground that: 
(a) The order sought to be enforced was issued by an agency without jurisdiction to issue the order; .... 
(4) Decisions on complaints seeking civil enforcement ofan agency's order are reviewable in the same manner as 
other civil cases." 
5 See also Career Serv, Review Bd. v. Utah Dep'I of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 940-941 (Utah 1997) ("[A] 
suit to enforce such an administrative decision or order [ under predecessor statute Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
l 9(1 )(a) (1993)] is an original and independent proceeding, and such actions are actions at law ... and are not 
actions on the admmistrative decision or order."). 
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Finally, the application of the limitation on enforcement of any fine in excess of$10,000 
per violation as provided by section 61-l-20)(b)(viii) makes logical sense. It would be 
irrational for the legislature to allow the Commission to impose a higher fine than lhe Director is 
capable of enforcing in the district court, given that greater due process protection is granted to 
the defendant in district court. This interpretation is also consistent with the application of the 
Unifonn Securities Act in other states (see opening Mem. in Supp. footnote 5). The Division's 
argument that the maxim unius est eclusio allerius applies to the separate subsections of 6 l-1-20 
is incorrect because these sections work together in concert, as held by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Bushman. Bushman 23 l P.3d at 839 n.4. In response to the Division •s lamentation 
that the requirement under either 61-1-20 or 636-4-501 that it seek civil enforcement of its orders 
i.n district court would do away with the usefulness of the administrative proceeding, this worry 
is overblown and invalid. The role of the District Court in an action to enforce an order is more 
limited than in an original enforcement proceeding brought in district court. In the former, the 
Court is focused on whether the Division has exceeded its jurisdiction by, for example, imposing 
a fine that cannot be rendered into a judgment within the terms of Section 61-1-20. Presumably, 
if the agency limits its actions to within the scope of its proper jurisdiction, the enforcement 
action will not be a substantial hurdle to the enforcement of administrative orders. 
B. The Commission Improperly Imposed Restitution by Establishing the Fine at 
the Amount of Investor Losses, Rather than Permitting Setoff of an 
Appropriately Calculated Fine for Restitution Actually Paid 
The Division's brief devotes little attention to the Commission's lack of authority to 
award restitution. Its only argument in favor of the award of restitution is that the Utah Court of 
Appeals allowed a reduction of the fine for restitution paid in Bushman. As described above, the 
Court in Bushman did not consider the issue raised here concerning the authority of the 
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Commission to order restitution. Additionally, the setoff of the fine for payment of restitution jn 
Bushman is wholly different from the Commission's improper award of a civil pena.lty of 
restitution in this case. In Phillips' case, the Commission expressly considered the amount of 
restitution when imposing a civil penalty and improperly awarded an amount in full payment of 
restitution, specifically imposing a civil penalty of $315:000 representing "investor losses", 
(Order, at 13), which it stated separately from the "fine" for violations of Utah Code 61-l-J of 
$78,750, and $25,000 in "investigative costs." Again, the restitution penalty that may be 
imposed by a district court under section 61-1-20(2) is not available lo the Commission. 
Nowhere does Jegislature grant the Commission authority to issue any form of restitution. The 
Commission improperly imposed restitution in excess of its st.atutory authority. Therefore, the 
Order imposes an unlawful civil penalty and must be overruled. 
C. The Commission's Fine Also Violates Phillips' freedom against excessive 
fines under the Eighth Amendment. 
The Division's attempts distinguish the case of U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (l 998) 
on its facts are irrelevant. Bajakajian is cited for the test adopted by Utah Courts for determining 
whether fines are excessive under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
which provides,"[ e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed ... " U.S. 
Const. amend. VIIL; see also: Utah Const. art. I,§ 9. ·The touchstone of the constitutional 
inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of 
forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish_,~ 
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334. If the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the 
gravity of the defendanCs offense, it is unconstitutional.'\ State v. Real Property at 633 E. 640 
N., 2000 UT 17, ii 14, 994 P.2d 1254. Jn the context of administrative proceedings, Utah courts 
apply this test by balancing a number of factors including the "gravity of the offense, the 
7 
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maximum fine that could be imposed, the extent of the unlawful activity, the amount of illegal 
gain in relation to the penalty, and the harm caused." Brent Brown Dealerships v. Tax. Comm., 
2006 UT App 261,, 18, 139 P.3d 296. 
The Division's argument that the $413,750 penalty imposed in this case on a defendant 
who did not receive the investor money stolen by third parties is justified is based solely on the 
Division's improper presumption that the legislature intended to grant the Commission limitless 
authority to sanction a securities defendant in the Commission's best judgment and that jt is the 
constitutionality of that judgment should not be challenged. As argued above. this is an incorrect 
interpretation of the statute, and the legislative intent. Additionally) even if a court were to 
determine that the Division's authority to set the amount of the fine was without express 
statutory limit, the constitutional cap on the amount of the fine imposed by the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution is still in place and it becomes al) the more 
important. The proper comparison by which a court should detennine what the legislature 
considers an appropriate maximum penalty for conduct in violation of the Utah Securities Act is 
the maximum $ l 0,000 per offense applicable to district court proceedings as stated in 6 l-1-
20(2)(b )(viii). Additionally, a court considering the constitutionality of the amount of the fine 
should reference the similar maximum penalties permitted by other states that have adopted the 
Uniform Securities Act. (See Phillips 1 opening briet). Under this analysis., a fine of $413: 750 
against an unlicensed individual who did not receive the investor moneys is clearly excessive, 
especia)]y where~ as here, it is so harsh as to make the defendant Phillips impecunious. 
D. The Executive Director Cannot Substitute the Division's Post Hoc 
Rationalizations for the Reasoning of the Commission. 
The Division attempts to remedy deficiencies in the Comrnjssion:s findings of fact by 
supplementing the record with its own post hoc analysis. This is improper post hoc 
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rationalization by the Division's counsel. It is a well-established principle of law that courts 
"may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action", but instead 
require "that an agencf s ... order be upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated by the 
agency itselCi Talk AM, Inc. v. Mich Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2263 (2011) (quoting SEC 
v. CfumeryCorp., 332 U.S. 194 (l947)). Utah Admin. Code R 164-31 provides thatthe 
Commission shall consider the following factors in setting a fine: 
(a) the serious, nature, circumstances, extent, and persistence of the conduct 
constituting the violation; (b) the harm to other persons, including the amount of 
investor losses, resulting either directly or indirectly from the violation; (c) any 
financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other consideration received 
directly or indirectly by the person in connection with the violation; (d) 
cooperation by the person in any inquiry .. -~ efforts to prevent future occurrences 
of the violation, and efforts to mitigate the harm caused by the violation, 
including any restitution paid or disgorgement of ill-gotten gains to persons 
injured ... ; (e) the history of previous violations by the person; (f) the need to 
deter the person or other persons from committing such vjolations in the future; 
(g) the costs of the Division incurred in investigating and prosecuting the action; 
and (h) such other matters as justice may require. 
There is no evidence whatsoever that the Commission considered and made findings on these 
factors. It certainly did not make the detailed factual findings suggested for the first time in the 
Division's brief. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. The Division's Counsel invited error by 
arguing in the hearing that the Commission should simply award a ·'standard" 12S% amount of 
the investor loss as a fine and add attorneys' fees to arrive at the civil penalty of $315,000 "in 
investor }osses'\ an additional "fine" of 78,750, and $25;000 in investigative costs. (See Tr. 4-
21-14 at 425-426). The Commission accepted the Division's suggestion verbatim without 
explanation. (See Order at 13.) The validity of the Commission's Order must be determined 
without reference to post hoc rationalizations. 
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11. THE DIVISION'S ACTION IN REGARDS TO THE GIT TRANSACTION JS 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND EQUAL APPLICATION 
OF THE DIVISION'S POLICY AGAINST BRINGING ENFORCEMENT 
PROCEEDINGS ON CLAIMS OLDER THAN FIVE YEARS. 
The Division's argument that no statute of limitations applies is based on its improper 
reasoning that a civil enforcement action is not required. As demonstrated supra, the Division's 
attempt to avoid a civil enforcement action by claiming unwritten authority to file an ''Abstract 
of Award1 ' is an improper attempt to avoid the clear requirement of section 61-l-20(b) that the 
Division's orders be enforced, if at aJI, by filing a civil action in the district court. Again, the 
legislature never intended to write the Division a blank check to bring claims in its discretion 
whenever it pleases. Although the Commission was required to determine whether the 
Division's five year policy should be applied in this case, it improperly declined to make any 
findings concerning whether treatment of similarly situation defendants is equal and left the 
appJication of the five year rule entirely to the Division~s agency discretion. '(Agency 
discretion" cannot simply be an excuse for facially unequal treatment under the policy without or 
agency discretion would swallow the rule against unequal treatment. 
Ill. THE UTAH SECURITIES ACTION SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN AN 
OVERBROAD INTERPRETATION THAT WOULD REQUIRE ALL PERSONS 
TO CONDUCT DUE DILIGENCE BEFORE DISCUSSING A SECURITY WITH 
A FRIEND. 
As fully briefed in Phil.ljps, opening brief, PhiJlips was not the legal '~maker'' of an untrue 
statement within the meaning of§ 61-1-1(2), at least as to the emerald investment. Phillips as an 
unpaid source of an investment recommendation is not required to conduct "due diligence" when 
recommending an investment to friends. To requfre otherwise exposes countless uninfonned 
persons giving no more than friendly advice to sever sanctions under Utah's Securities Act. This 
was not the intent of the Act. Janus Capital g.ives Utah Courts the pathway to make a necessary 
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distinction between the maker of a misleading statement and someone like Phillips who simply 
didn't do due diligence and was not in a fiduciary position. 
IV. THE COMMISSION IMPROPERLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO 
PHILLIPS CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF INVESTOR LOSS. 
Notwithstanding the Division ~s new characterization of the emeralds at issue in this case 
as "rocks'', there can be no dispute on appeal of the administrative order that the emerald deal 
resulted in the importation of "31 barrels of "raw uncut emeralds". (See Stipulation of facts 
120.) The Perschs admitted they were in possession of al I or most of these barrels of emeralds. 
Although the Commission concluded they were not "gem quality emeralds", these emeralds are 
of potentially significant value. The question is whether, given the acknowledged existence of 
"emeralds" relating to the emerald deal in the Perschs possession, and the Commission's 
acknowledgement that "an offset [for the value of the emeralds] might be appropriate", (Order at 
13), the Commission. ~}6pcrly imposed the burden of proof relating to the existence of value on 
I 
Phillips rather than imposing a burden of proof on the Division to show that the emeralds did not 
exceed the value of the Pcrshs cash expended in the deal. The answer is that the Commission's 
requirement that Phillips prove the value of the emeralds as an offset is in error because the only 
ap_Rlicable statute clearly imposes the burden of proof on the Division. Under Utah Adm in Code 
conduct violated the Securities Act and (2) that the penalties it requests are justified. This places 
a burden on the Division to provide enough evidence lo the Commission that the Commission 
can properly impose the requested fine. The value of the emeralds in the Perschs' possession 
determines whether the Perschs suffered actual damage from the scheme. lt is high\y significant 
1n this matter because the Commission relied exclusively on investor lossi and primarily the 
Perchs! alleged losses in the emera!d deal, to determine the fine imposed on Mr. Phillips. (Order, 
I I 
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at 13). In shifting the Division's burden to Phillips. the Commission committed a reversible 
error. See Han·ington v. Office of Miss Secy. of State, l 29 So.3d I 53, 173-75 (Miss. 20 l 3) 
(reversing a division's fine because the division failed to provide "evidence regarding the 
specific number of investors and the violations against each"). The Division's briefing on this 
issue is notably lacking citation to any legal authority that requires Phillips lo prove the value of 
the em era Ids as an offset. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, on the basis of the arguments set forth above, Phillips requests that the Executive 
Director review the decision of the Commission and grant the relief requested in Phillips' 
opening brief. 
Respectfully SUBMITTED this 25th day of August, 2014. 
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